Does group discussion lead to better informed and more strategic market entry decisions? by Murad, Zahra
 
 
 
 
Does group discussion lead to better informed and more strategic 
market entry decisions? 
 
Zahra Murad* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
We investigate the possibility of group discussion serving as an implicit information channel 
to eliminate biased entry decisions into experimental markets. We find that groups are more 
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1 Introduction  
Previous research has shown that the industries with high entry rates tend to have high rates of 
business failure independent of the size of the industry, the profitability or barriers to entry (Dunne, 
Roberts & Samuelson 1988; Mata & Portugal 1994, Geroski 1996). Motivated by these findings, 
Camerer & Lovallo (1999) link the success of entrants in experimental markets to their performance in 
a trivia quiz and explain excess entry by entrepreneurial overconfidence. Moore & Cain (2007; 
henceforth M&C) replicate Camerer and Lovallo’s experiment extending it to involve difficult as well 
as simple quizzes. Subjects enter excessively into markets with simple and insufficiently into markets 
with difficult quizzes against the benchmark condition where entrants’ success is determined 
randomly.1  
M&C attribute this difference in entry rates to asymmetric information one possesses about 
self versus others. Providing explicit information on competitors’ performance demonstrably 
decreases competitive entry failures in foregone profits and direct losses (Radzevick & Moore 2008; 
Ewers 2012). In this paper, we investigate the possibility of group discussion providing implicit 
information in market entry games with simple and difficult quiz tasks. We speculate that group 
discussion may deliver additional information about general knowledge and quiz difficulty among 
participants in the experiment. This additional information in turn may help infer competitors’ 
performance leading to more strategic market entry decisions.  
A further rationale to study groups’ competitive entry decisions is that many important real 
world competitions are between groups rather than individuals, such as in inter-organizational grant 
contests and sports tournaments. It is not surprising that recently, group decision making has aroused 
considerable interest in economic research. The main finding has been that groups make more self-
interested strategic decisions, are cognitively more sophisticated than individuals and learn faster 
(reviewed by Charness & Sutter 2012). Kocher & Sutter (2005) and Sutter (2005) show that groups of 
three perform better in beauty contest games compared to individuals. Market entry games are similar 
to beauty contest games with an analogous requirement to engage in hierarchical reasoning and act 
strategically based on predictions of other players’ decisions. We thus test whether groups’ decisions 
are more strategic to start with and whether groups are more likely to learn from repetition and 
feedback compared to individuals. 
 
2 Experimental Design  
We replicated M&C’s design as a baseline condition (Individual) and extended it with a treatment 
condition (Group) and a control condition (IndInfo) to investigate whether group discussion led to 
better informed and more strategic entry decisions. Individual and IndInfo conditions were identical 
except in the IndInfo condition subjects were given additional information on the average number of 
correct answers per quiz in previous sessions before their entry decisions took place. In the Group 
treatment, 21 participants were randomly allocated group numbers and seated in separated cubicles 
in groups of three. Group members could talk face-to-face among themselves without being heard by 
others and submit one decision per group in each round.  
The experiment consisted of a 12 round market entry game with 7 players deciding 
simultaneously whether to enter a market or to stay out. Payoffs were determined according to Table 
                                                          
1 Cain, Moore & Haran (2015) further show that overconfidence in simple and underconfidence in difficult tasks 
can explain current trends in market entry behaviour in the field: controlling for entry barriers, entry rates are 
below market capacity in markets perceived as difficult (e.g. metal mining, forestry, agricultural) and above 
market capacity in markets perceived as simple (e.g. food stores, hobby shops).  
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1 and were common knowledge.2 Each player had to submit one decision per round indicating their 
choice. There were four simple, four difficult and four random rounds, where the ranks of entrants 
were determined according to their scores respectively in simple and difficult quizzes and randomly. 
The rounds were presented to subjects either in Simple-Random-Difficult or Difficult-Random-Simple 
order with the quiz order also re-shuffled across sessions to avoid any order effects.  
The quizzes were pre-tested on British students so that the variance in answers between the 
subjects would be minimal: out of 5, the correct answers averaged to 0.65 (s.d. 0.70) in the difficulty 
and 4.3 (s.d. 0.9) in the easy quizzes. Thus, winning in a quiz round was mostly due to luck, being very 
comparable to random rounds. Additionally, players’ decisions in the random rounds acted as within-
subject control for their risk attitudes and the difference in entry rates into random and quiz rounds 
was our primary measure of excessive and insufficient entry.  
 
Table 1: Experimental Payoffs from Entering into Market 
Rank Payoff 
1st £14 
2nd £10 
3rd £5 
4th -£10 
5th -£10 
6th -£10 
7th -£10 
Staying out paid £0. Losses were subtracted from the £10  
endowment subjects received at the beginning of the experiment. 
 
Following M&C, we elicited beliefs of players after their entry decisions with the following 
unincentivized questions:3 
Q1. How many players in total do you think entered the market this round?  Include 
yourself in this figure if you chose to enter.  
Q2. How many of the other six players in this round do you think scored higher than you 
did? (regardless of whether anyone entered) 
Q3. How many quiz questions do you think you got correct in this round? 
Q4. How many quiz questions do you think the average player got correct this round? 
Q5. If you chose to enter the market this round, what rank do you think you will get? 
After answering these questions, every individual/group received full feedback on their own and 
others’ quiz scores, entry decisions and rankings.  
In total 210 British students recruited through ORSEE (Greiner 2015) participated in 18 
experimental sessions at the University of Nottingham yielding 6 independent clusters per treatment. 
The experiment lasted 60 minutes with an average payment of £11.70 determined according to a 
random incentive scheme across rounds. The design was partly computerized using the software Ztree 
(Fischbacher 2007) and partly pen-and-paper to accommodate for the open-ended-answer format of 
quizzes.4 
                                                          
2 Each group member earned the same amount in order to keep the marginal incentive for each player constant 
and comparable to the individual conditions.  
3 Sutter et al. (2013) report significant differences in belief formation process between groups and individuals. 
For the purposes of replication, we chose to keep the belief elicitation in the Group treatment the same and not 
restrict what groups could report and how. 
 4 See Appendix A for the experimental instructions, quizzes, a sample feedback screen and decision sheet. 
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3 Results  
3.1 Are groups better informed than individuals?  
In Table 2 we test for the accuracy in beliefs of groups compared to individuals for each of the 
five belief elicitation questions. Overall we find that groups are slightly more informed than 
individuals: their predictions of own score (Q3) in the simple rounds, average score (Q4) and own rank 
conditional on entry (Q5) in difficult rounds is significantly more accurate than individuals. However 
groups are not as accurate as individuals with additional information: all beliefs in the IndInfo 
condition, except in Q3 of simple rounds, are more accurate than in the Group treatment.   
 
Table 2 
Dependent Variable: Mean absolute difference between 
predicted and actual 
Q1 Simple Difficult Random 
Individual 0.21 (.28) 0.13 (.28) -0.21 (.25) 
IndInfo -0.17 (.27) -0.46 (.29) -0.08 (.22) 
Constant 1.21 (.19)*** 1.46 (.19)*** 1.29 (.19)*** 
N 504 504 497 
Q2 Simple Difficult  
Individual 0.11 (.22) 0.27 (.20)  
IndInfo -0.47 (.11)*** -0.01 (.14)  
Constant 1.79 (.06)*** 1.89 (.13)***  
N 504 503  
Q3 Simple Difficult  
Individual 1.15 (.51)** 0.90 (.59)  
IndInfo 0.21 (.06)*** -0.25 (.04)***  
Constant 0.22 (.05)*** 0.48 (.04)***  
N 502 502  
Q4 Simple Difficult  
Individual 0.47 (.32) 1.05 (.39)**  
IndInfo -0.17 (.05)*** -0.14 (.09)  
Constant 0.69 (.05)*** 0.84 (.05)***  
N 504 503  
Q5 Simple Difficult  
Individual -0.03 (.22) 0.46 (.26)*  
IndInfo -0.24 (.27) -0.03 (.18)  
Constant 1.61 (.11)*** 1.10 (.16)***  
N 341 190  
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression with the baseline Group. 
Clustered standard errors at session level are reported in parentheses.  
*10%, **5%, ***1% significance levels. 
 
3.2 Do groups make more strategic market entry decisions?  
Figure 1 plots the entry rates in each treatment across 12 rounds and shows a successful replication 
of M&C’s results in our Individual treatment. Table 3 tests for the significance of entry biases across 
treatments in the first and second halves of the experiment. We observe no difference between 
Individual and Group treatment in the first half of the experiment where both individuals and groups 
enter excessively into simple and insufficiently into difficult rounds compared to their entry rates in 
random rounds. In the second half of the experiment we still observe significant bias in entry decisions 
of groups and individuals with significantly higher excess entry of groups into simple rounds.  
In the IndInfo treatment on the other hand, we observe more strategic entry decisions with a 
lower difference in entry rates between quiz and random rounds in the first half which completely 
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disappears in the second half of the experiment. In Appendix B, we present a plot of mean payoffs 
across rounds for each treatment condition and test for treatment differences in mean payoffs. We 
find that, overall, groups earn slightly more than individuals in the Individual but less than those in the 
IndInfo condition. This difference in earnings is mainly due to the significant differences in payoffs in 
the simple rounds of the experiment, accentuating the implications of excessive entry into markets. 
This result in turn shows the economic significance of biased entry decisions and how explicit 
information in the IndInfo treatment but not implicit information in the Group treatment earned 
subjects more money.  
 
Table 3  
              Rounds 1-6            Rounds 7-12 
Pairwise test of mean difference between simple, random and difficult rounds equals to zero 
Mean Difference  MS—MD MS—MR MD—MR MS—MD MS—MR MD—MR 
Individual 4.00 (.29)** 1.75 (.11)** -2.25 (.33)** 1.67 (.42)** 1.00 (.29)** -0.07 (.36) 
Group 4.58 (.57)** 1.83 (.38)** -2.75 (.38)** 1.42 (.66)* 1.92 (.30)** 0.50 (.62) 
IndInfo 2.58 (.30)** 1.17 (.28)** -1.42 (.51)** 0.08 (.49) 0.42 (.38) 0.33 (.44) 
p-values from a pairwise test of equality of mean differences between treatment conditions  
Group=Individual 0.3743 0.7992 0.3708 0.6279 0.0613 0.1705 
Group=IndInfo 0.0240 0.2469 0.0641 0.2248 0.0147 0.9358 
Individual=IndInfo 0.0121 0.0750 0.1970 0.0325 0.2850 0.1201 
MS: Mean Entry in Simple, MR: Mean Entry in Random and MD: Mean Entry in Difficult round. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. **5%, ***1% significance levels according to matched pair signed rank test. P-values are from Wilcoxon ranksum 
test. 
 
4 Conclusion 
A recent research agenda in business and economics literature has investigated the effects of incorrect 
beliefs on individuals’ decisions to enter excessively into competitions with easy and avoid 
competitions with difficult tasks. Additional information on competitors’ performances in turn was 
been shown to correct those beliefs and decrease competitive entry failures (Radzevick & Moore 
2008; Ewers 2012). As a novel research question we propose that group discussion provides implicit 
information channel leading to more strategic market entry decisions. Our experiment confirms that 
groups hold more accurate beliefs than individuals in predicting their own and others’ performance 
and ranks. However, we do not find any evidence of this leading to more strategic entry decisions: 
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Figure 1: Entry rates across rounds 
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both individuals and groups enter excessively into simple and insufficiently into difficult markets and 
earn less than individuals who are provided with explicit performance information.  
One caveat to our study in concluding that groups make similar entry decision to individuals 
is our focus on face-to-face group discussion and joint entry decisions. This however is one of the most 
natural environments that group decision making takes place in the “wild” and is a good starting point 
to answer whether groups make more strategic competitive entry decisions than individuals. Other 
group environments, such as voting on the entry decision or individual decision making following 
group discussion, are areas for further research.  
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Appendix A 
Experimental Instructions [for the Group Treatment] 
Welcome! 
You are about to participate in an experiment.  There are 7 [21] people participating in the 
experiment [and participants have been divided into 7 groups of 3.  This group composition will 
remain fixed for the whole experiment.] You must not communicate with anyone. [You will be 
allowed to communicate with people in your group but you must not communicate with anyone 
outside your group.] If you have a question at any time during the experiment, please raise your 
hand and someone will come to your desk to answer it. 
The use of electronic devices such as mobile phones, music players, and tablet computers is 
strictly prohibited. Please make sure that all such devices are turned off and put away out of 
sight.  
If you break these rules, you will be excluded from the experiment without receiving any 
payment and be disqualified from future experiments with CeDEx.  
 
Market Entry Experiment 
In this experiment, you [your group] will be playing the role of an entrepreneur who has to choose 
whether to enter into new markets.  Entering a new market can be highly profitable if your group 
does well.  On the other hand, if competition is too tough, you [your group] may lose money.  The 
experiment will consist of a number of rounds. In each round, you [your group] will make one 
entry decision. The decisions made [by groups] will affect your final payoff.  
Each round, market rankings will be determined in one of two ways. In some rounds, the rankings 
of all entrants will be determined by scores on a trivia quiz. In other rounds, all entrants will be 
ranked randomly (by being assigned a random score). In each round, the participants [groups] 
that have entered will be ranked according to their scores and they [their group members] will 
receive payoffs according to this table: 
 
Your [Group’s] Rank 
Point Payoff [for Each 
Member of Your Group]              
1st 14 
2nd 10 
3rd 5 
4th -10 
5th -10 
6th -10 
7th -10 
 
The top 3 people [groups] who decided to enter the market will each earn points.  Higher-ranked 
entrants will earn more, according to the table above.  If more than 3 people [groups] enter the 
market, those [the members of groups] ranked below 3rd will lose 10 points each. You [your group] 
may always choose to stay out of the market; staying out means you neither gain nor lose 
anything.  
For participating in this experiment, each of you will receive a £10 base payment. In addition, you 
can earn points in each round as described above. At the end of the experiment, three of the 
rounds will be randomly selected and your points from those three rounds will be averaged and 
then converted into cash at a rate of £1 per point.  For each of you, this amount will be added to 
(or, if you lost points, subtracted from) your £10 base payment.   
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Manipulation in the IndInfo Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Note: The frame is added to highlight the information manipulation in the IndInfo 
treatment. Subjects did not see the frame in their decision sheets.] 
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Quizzes [the answers are given in parentheses] 
Simple A 
What is the capital city of Greece? [Athens] 
Who is the author of the “Harry Potter” books? [J.K. Rowling] 
What is the character name of the animated star of the computer game and movie Tomb 
Raider? [Lara Croft] 
What was the first name of Bonaparte, a French military and political leader of late 18th early 
19thcenturies France? [Napoleon]   
Which country, located in the northern Eurasia, is the largest country in the world? [Russia] 
Tiebreaker:  What is the height of Eiffel Tower in metres? [320] 
 
Simple B 
What is the capital city of Argentina? [Buenos Aires] 
Who wrote the play “Hamlet”?  [Shakespeare]  
Which actress played the title role in the 1990 film “Pretty Woman”? [J. Roberts] 
What was the name of the admiral famously known for his part in the victory of Britain in 
the Battle of Trafalgar? [Nelson] 
Which river, located in Northern Africa, is the longest river in the world? [Nile] 
Tiebreaker:  How many member states are there in United Nations? [193] 
 
Simple C 
What is the capital city of France? [Paris] 
Who wrote the novel “The Life and Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby”? [Charles Dickens] 
Which cartoon show included characters called Thelma and Shaggy? [Scooby doo] 
What was the name of the famous ship that left the British port of Southampton with the 
aim of reaching New York City in the United States in 1912 but tragically sank on its Maiden 
Voyage? [Titanic]  
Which mountain peak, located in the range Himalayas, is the highest peak in the world? 
[Everest] 
Tiebreaker:  How many films did Alfred Hitchcock direct (including short films and 
documentaries)? [61] 
 
Simple D 
What is the capital city of China? [Beijing] 
Please complete the title of the Tolstoy’s novel: “War and …. [Peace] 
What type of animal was Stuart, in the 1999 film “Stuart Little”? [Mouse] 
Who served as a Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2010? [Gordon Brown] 
What mountain peak, located in Scotland, is the highest peak in Britain? [Ben Nevis] 
Tiebreaker:  How many men signed the American Declaration of Independence? [56] 
 
Difficult A 
What is the capital city of Bahrain? [Manama] 
Who wrote the novel “Master and Margarita”? [Bulgakov] 
Who is the voice of adult Simba in the 1994 film “The Lion King”? [Matthew Broderick] 
What is the name of the Battle also known as Battle of the Nations fought in 1813 by Russia 
Prussia, Austria and Sweden against Napoleon? [Leipzig]  
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Which mountain peak, located in the range of Guiana Highlands, is the highest peak in 
Brazil? [Pico de Neblina]  
Tiebreaker: How many days did British-American astronaut Michael Foalespend in space? 
[374] 
 
Difficult B 
What is the capital city of Togo? [Lome] 
What Chilean author wrote Sub Terra? [Baldomero Lillo] 
What is the real name of the actor playing the character Cramden in the 2008 film “Toe 
Tactic”? [John Sayles] 
Who was the Prime Minister of United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940? [Chamberlain] 
Which river, with its source in the Great Slave Lake, is the longest river in Canada? 
[Mackenzie] 
Tiebreaker: How many thousands of squared kilometres is the area of Madagascar?  [587] 
 
Difficult C 
What is the capital city of Suriname? [Paramaribo] 
What is the surname of the German brothers known for their collections of fairy tales? 
Brothers ….. [Grimm] 
What is the real name of the actress playing Aunt Tina Little in the 1999 film “Stuart Little”? 
[Connie Ray] 
Who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1905 to 1908? [Henry Campbell-
Bannerman] 
What country in Africa borders only with Senegal? [Gambia] 
Tiebreaker: How many thousand kilometres is the coastline of Canada? [202] 
 
Difficult D 
What is the capital city of Russia? [Moscow] 
What was the surname of the literary character Nana in Emil Zola’s novel titled “Nana”? 
[Coupeau] 
What is the real name of the actor playing The Tin Man in the 1939 film “Wizard of Oz”? 
[Jack Haley] 
Who was the king of England between 1327 and 1377? [Edward III] 
What country surrounds two other countries? [Italy] 
Tiebreaker: What year was the ex-Prime minister of United Kingdom Arthur Balfour born? 
[1848] 
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Sample Feedback Screen as seen after Round 8 
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Figure B1: Mean Payoff across Rounds
Table B1 
Dependent Variable: Mean Payoff with the Group treatment as baseline  
Simple  Rounds 1-6 Rounds 7-12 All rounds 
Individual -1.07 (.47)** -1.37 (.56)** -1.22 (.41)*** 
IndInfo 1.67 (.57)*** 1.13 (.56)** 1.39 (.51)** 
Constant -0.14 (.43) 1.40 (.40) .63 (.38) 
N 252 252 504 
Difficult Rounds 1-6 Rounds 7-12 All rounds 
Individual 0.01 (.59) -0.06 (.71) -0.03 (.37) 
IndInfo 0.58 (.51) 0.18 (.65) 0.38 (.37) 
Constant 2.04 (.27)*** 2.65 (.44)*** 2.35 (.29)*** 
N 252 252 504 
Random Rounds 1-6 Rounds 7-12 All rounds 
Individual 0.12 (.55) -0.71 (.43) -0.29 (.45) 
IndInfo 0.36 (.42) -0.29 (.28) 0.03 (.29) 
Constant 2.29 (.14) 3.43 (.12)*** 2.86 (.10)*** 
N 252 252 504 
Overall Rounds 1-6 Rounds 7-12 All rounds 
Individual -0.32 (.32) -0.71 (.39)* -0.51 (.29)* 
IndInfo 0.87 (.36)** 0.34 (.33) 0.60  (.32)* 
Constant 1.39 (.23)*** 2.49 (.22)*** 1.94 (.22)*** 
N 756 756 1512 
The reported coefficients are from an OLS regression. Clustered standard errors at session level 
are reported in parentheses. * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels. 
